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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1890, Congress enacted the Sherman Antitrust Act' in order
to promote competition within our national economy. 2 Pursuant to
its constitutional powers under the commerce clause,3 Congress pro-
hibited contracts, combinations, and conspiracies "in restraint of
trade or commerce among the several States"' and monopolization
or attempted monopolization of "any part of the trade or commerce
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976) (originally enacted as Act of July 2, 1890, ch. 647, § 1, 26
Stat. 209).
2. In discussing the policy behind the Sherman Act, the Supreme Court noted in North-
ern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958):
The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed
at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade. It rests on the premise
that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best allocation of
our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest material
progress, while at the same time providing an environment conducive to the preservation
of our democratic political and social institutions.
3. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8. The commerce clause provides in part: "The Congress shall
have Power . .. To regulate Commerce'. . . among the Several States . . . ."
4. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides in part: "Every contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States . . . is declared to be illegal."
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among the several States."5 Although the jurisdictional language in
the Sherman Act parallels the language used in the commerce
clause, Congress provided no further guidance in defining the Act's
jurisdictional scope. Thus, one of the most confusing issues that has
developed in the area of antitrust law is the extent to which the
Sherman Act governs interstate and/or intrastate activities.'
Congress has enacted numerous federal statutes in addition to
the Sherman Act pursuant to its power under the commerce clause.
In general, these statutes are designed to either protect individual
rights or regulate economic matters. An example of the first group
of statutes is the Civil Rights Act of 1964,1 whose jurisdictional
requirements have been broadly interpreted to reach acts denying
individual rights, even though these acts may not have an apparent
impact on interstate commerce." Illustrative of the second group of
statutes is the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,1 whose antifraud
provisions have been read to reach fraudulent actions that occurred
during an intrastate telephone conversation because the telephone.
wires also carried interstate messages. 0 This liberal approach to-
wards federal jurisdiction, as exemplified by the federal civil rights
and securities laws, has carried over into other substantive areas.
For example, the federal regulation of gambling and organized
crime," food and drug mislabeling, 2 deceptive sales,'" and labor
5. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976). Section 2 of the Sherman Act provides in part: "Every person
who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire . . . to monopolize
any part of the trade or commerce among the several States . . . shall be deemed guilty of a
felony . . . ."
6. For earlier discussions on this subject see generally Eiger, The Commerce Element
in Federal Antitrust Litigation, 25 FED. B.J. 282 (1965); Furgeson, The Commerce Test for
Jurisdiction under the Sherman Act, 12 Hous. L. REv. 1052 (1975); Kallis, Local Conduct
and the Sherman Act, 1959 DuKE L.J. 236; Krotinger, The "Essentially Local" Doctrine and
Section I of the Sherman Act, 15 W. RES. L. REV. 66 (1963); Note, Portrait of the Sherman
Act as a Commerce Clause Statute, 49 N.Y.U. L. REv. 323 (1974); Note, The Confusing World
of Interstate Commerce and Jurisdiction under the Sherman Act, 21 Vnu. L. REV. 721 (1976).
7. 42 U.S.C. H§ 2000a to 2000h-6 (1976).
8. In Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969), the Court enjoined the denial of membership
to blacks in a recreational facility, partly on the ground that a snack bar on the premises
served food whose ingredients had traveled in interstate commerce. See also Katzenbach v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241
(1964).
9. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976).
10. Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 727-28 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951
(1968).
11. United States v. Five Gambling Devices, 346 U.S. 441 (1953); United States v.
Chambers, 382 F.2d 910 (6th Cir. 1967); United States v. Barrow, 363 F.2d 62 (3d Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1001 (1967); United States v. Zizzo, 338 F.2d 577 (7th Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 381 U.S. 915 (1965).
12. United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689 (1948); United States v. Walsh, 331 U.S.
432 (1947); United States v. Nutrition Serv. Inc., 227 F. Supp. 375 (W.D. Pa. 1964), aff'd,
347 F.2d 233 (3d Cir. 1965).
13. FTC v. Mandel Bros., 359 U.S. 385 (1959); Morton's Inc. v. FTC, 286 F.2d 158 (1st
Cir. 1961).
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standards" has seldom been impeded by a failure to find interstate
commerce pursuant to the jurisdictional requirements of a particu-
lar statute.'" Although the various federal statutes based upon the
commerce clause employ different language in defining their juris-
dictional scope, and contain differences in legislative intent, the
courts have taken a fairly uniform approach in applying an expan-
sive reading to the jurisdictional requirements of these statutes.
Judicial interpretation of the Sherman Act, however, has not
been as uniformly broad as that of the majority of commerce clause
statutes. Lacking clear support from the legislative history or spe-
cific language of the Act, courts have nonetheless occasionally lim-
ited the jurisdictional reach of the Sherman Act. This confusion
over the jurisdictional requirements of the Act has led to substantial
litigation" and often resulted in inconsistent decisions. Although
the Supreme Court recently has taken a fairly expansive approach
toward the jurisdictional scope of the Sherman Act, 7 some of the
lower courts have continued to narrowly interpret the Act's jurisdic-
tional reach."
An individual is entitled to know the legal consequences of his
acts. This is especially true in the field of antitrust law where litiga-
tion can be excessively time consuming and costly. Unfortunately,
antitrust law is often in such a state of flux that predicting one's
potential antitrust liability in a particular area can be quite diffi-
14. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); Murray v. Noblesville Milling Co., 131
F.2d 470 (7th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 775 (1943); Flemming v. A. B. Kirschbaum
Co., 124 F.2d 567 (3d Cir. 1941). But see National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833
(the Court's decision to overrule a federal statute regulating the wages and hours of state
employees was not based on the commerce clause analysis, however, but rather on the ground
that Congress had impermissibly infringed upon state sovereignty).
15. An exception to this broad approach to the jurisdictional tests is the interstate
commerce requirement of both the Clayton and Robinson-Patman Acts, which contain spe-
cific statutory language requiring a narrow reading of the jurisdictional requirement. The
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1976), for example, which supplemented the Sherman Act
in 1914, requires that the illegal activity itself must occur directly in the flow of interstate
commerce. United States v. American Bldg. Maintenance Indus., 422 U.S. 271 (1975); Gulf
Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 201-02 (1974). Similarly, for jurisdiction under
the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 13a-c, 21a (1976), an actual interstate sale must
be involved. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 199-201 (1974).
The Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1976), also had a restrictive
jurisdictional requirement similar to that of the Clayton and Robinson-Patman Acts. In 1975,
however, Congress amended section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45
(1976), to prohibit "unfair methods of competition in or affecting interstate commerce, and
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce." The Act was amended in order
to broaden the regulatory powers of the FTC in light of our increasingly interconnected
national economy and in view of the jurisdictional reach of the Sherman Act. H.R. REP. No.
93-1107, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 12, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 7702, 7713.
16. For a detailed listing of cases involving the jurisdictional requirement of the Sher-
man Act, see 16 VON KAuNowscI, BusimEss ORGANIZATIONS § 5.01 (1978).
17. See notes 85-106 infra and accompanying text.
18. See notes 113-25 infra and accompanying text.
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cult." The confusion surrounding the jurisdictional requirement of
the Sherman Act, in turn, has unnecessarily increased this uncer-
tainty. Moreover, the confusion over the jurisdictional reach of the
Sherman Act may have an even greater impact if the Supreme
Court continues to limit the "state action" doctrine and allows
Sherman Act claims against local activities of county and municipal
governments.2 0 In light of these factors, this Note will describe the
confusion surrounding the jurisdictional requirement of the Sher-
man Act, analyze the Supreme Court's recent cases in this area and
their impact on the lower courts, and propose a plan for clarifying
much of the confusion over the jurisdictional reach of the Sherman
Act.
II. INrrlAL SUPREME COURT DEVELOPMENT
OF THE JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENT
In the first Sherman Act case to reach the Supreme Court,
United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 21 the interstate commerce re-
quirement almost caused the early demise of the Act. In Knight the
Court held that a national monopoly of sugar manufacturing was
beyond the constitutional reach of the Sherman Act because the
mere manufacturing of sugar was not "commerce." Manufacturing
was deemed to be a wholly local activity despite the fact that raw
materials were shipped into the state and the refined sugar was
eventually shipped back out of state.22
The Knight decision, however, was subjected to almost imme-
diate reappraisal. In Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States23
the Court held that a price-fixing agreement among iron pipe manu-
facturers located in several states fell within the Sherman Act's
jurisdiction because the combination directly affected both the
manufacturer of the pipe and its national distribution.24 The Court
19. See, e.g., White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963) (vertical restraints
are not per se illegal). But see United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967)
(vertical restraints are per se illegal). Recently, the Court changed its position again in
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (vertical restraints are not
per se illegal).
20. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978) ("state
action" doctrine does not automatically exempt governmental entities, whether state agen-
cies or subdivisions of the state, from antitrust laws simply by reason of their status as such);
Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Cant~r v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976);
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975); Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
21. 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
22. Id. at 12, 17.
23. 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
24. The Court distinguished Knight by noting that the sugar monopoly in Knight dealt
with manufacturing, a local activity, and therefore had no direct connection with interstate
1218 [Vol. 32:1215
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extended its interpretation of the jurisdictional scope of the Sher-
man Act still further in Swift & Co. v. United Statess by ruling that
a price-fixing agreement between meat dealers, although limited in
actual operation to a single state, was nonetheless federally adjudi-
cable because it was directed at the flow of meat in interstate com-
merce. This expansive approach continued in the case of United
States v. American Tobacco Co.,"2 which involved a tobacco com-
bine that was essentially the same as the sugar monopoly protected
in the Knight decision." The American Tobacco Court held, how-
ever, that the restraint exercised by the tobacco trust bore a direct
relation to interstate commerce and therefore satisfied the jurisdic-
tional requirements of the Sherman Act.
Thus, with the fading of the Knight decision,"2 the Court grad-
ually began to accept the concept of applying the Sherman Act to
essentially local activities if they touched either side of an interstate
transaction.29 This approach became known as the "flow of com-
merce" test. Under this test, an intrastate activity is "in com-
merce" if it is part of the continuous flow of a good that crosses a
state line. Manufacturing a product destined for interstate markets,
therefore, places the manufacturer "in commerce" for jurisdictional
purposes under the Sherman Act. The continuous flow may be bro-
ken if the good comes to rest within a state or is transformed into a
different product."
In 1942, the Supreme Court presented an alternative commerce
commerce. In Addyston Pipe, however, the illegal agreement itself was directed at both
manufacturing and interstate distribution. Id. at 240.
25. 196 U.S. 375 (1905).
26. 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
27. The Tobacco trust in American Tobacco manufactured and sold tobacco products,
but did not transport these products in commerce.
28. The rationale of the Knight decision was specifically repudiated in Standard Oil
Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 169 (1931), in which the Court stated that although
manufacturing itself was not commerce, an agreement concerning manufacturing that would
have the effect of limiting the supply or fixing the price of goods entering interstate commerce
would fall within the Sherman Act.
One aspect of the Knight decision that remains important, however, is that the Court
never reached the merits of the government's case because it made the constitutional com-
merce determination first. Today, most courts still treat the commerce question as a prelimi-
nary jurisdictional hurdle in antitrust cases.
29. One exception to this renunciation of the Knight rationale was the case of Federal
Baseball Club v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922), in
which the Court held that since the actual playing of a baseball game occurred within only
one state, there was no federal jurisdiction despite the interstate travel by the teams. Al-
though the Court has never overruled this decision, it has come to be viewed as an aberration
to which Congress has acquiesced due to the unique features of professional baseball. See
Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282 (1972).
30. See P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTrrausT LAw fI 232c (1978); 16 VoN KALiNOWSKI,
BusiNEss ORGANIZATIONS § 5.01[2] (1978).
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clause test in the case of Wickard v. Filburn.31 In an action arising
under the Agriculture Adjustment Act of 1938,3 the Court held that
the growing of wheat for one's family and farm animals falls within
the federal commerce power. In reaching this conclusion, the Court
stated that "even if . . . activity be local and though it may not be
regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached
by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate
commerce . . . ."33 Initially, this decision had only a minimal im-
pact on Sherman Act cases, which continued to adhere to the "flow
of commerce" test. In United States v. Yellow Cab Co. ," for ex-
ample, the Court held that local taxi service for interstate travelers
between rail terminals in Chicago constituted part of a continuous
interstate trip and was thus subject to the jurisdictional reach of
the Sherman Act.35 In the same decision, however, the Court
ruled that the Sherman Act did not apply to other local cab service
that involved the transportation of passengers between their resi-
dences, offices or hotels, and the train stations because it was not
within the flow of commerce.3 1
In Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar
Co. 3 1 the Court finally followed the lead of the Wickard decision and
adopted a second test for determining jurisdiction under the Sher-
man Act. Rather, than focus on the location of the alleged anticom-
petitive conduct, this approach emphasizes the economic effects of
that conduct.3 1 In applying this "affecting commerce" test,39 the
Court held that agreements between California sugar refiners to fix
the price paid local sugar beet growers violated the Sherman Act
even though the beets were transformed into sugar before shipment
to interstate markets. The Court reasoned that by virtue of the
interdependency between growing, refining and distributing the
sugar, the restraint and monopoly in the local market inevitably
would be reflected in the interstate commerce of the final product."
Following the broad approach taken in the Mandeville Farms
31. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
32. 7 U.S.C. H§ 1281-1407 (1976).
33. 317 U.S. at 125.
34. 332 U.S. 218 (1947).
35. Id. at 228-29.
36. Id. at 230-33.
37. 334 U.S. 219 (1948).
38. The Court noted that "the vital thing is the effect on commerce, not the precise
point at which the restraint occurs . . . ." Id. at 238. The Court also stressed that "the vital
question becomes whether the effect is sufficiently substantial and adverse . . . ." Id. at 234.
39. See P. AREEDA & D. TuRNER, supra note 30, at T 232d; 16 VoN KAuNOWSKI, supra
note 30, at § 5.01[3].
40. 334 U.S. at 242. One possible effect of the refiners' monopoly is that they would
receive the sugar beets at a lower price than competitor-refiners in other states.
LVol. 32:12151220
SHERMAN ACT JURISDICTION
decision, the Supreme Court extended the reach of the Sherman Act
to various local activities. In United States v. Women's Sportwear
Manufacturers Association" the Court ruled that the manufactur-
ing of garments by local contractors who later sold them to jobbers
located in the same state fell within the jurisdictional scope of the
Sherman Act. In reaching this conclusion, the Court stated:
The source of the restraint may be intrastate, as the making of a contract or
combination usually is; the application of the restraint may be intrastate, as
it often is; but neither matters if the necessary effect is to stifle or restrain
commerce among the states. If it is interstate commerce that feels the pinch,
it does not matter how local the operation which applies the squeeze.'
Similarly, in United States v. Employing Plasterers Association"
the Court considered an alleged conspiracy between a trade associa-
tion and union officials to restrain competition among Chicago plas-
tering contractors. In overturning the district court's dismissal for
lack of jurisdiction, the Court noted "[tihat wholly local business
restraints can produce the effects condemned by the Sherman Act
is no longer open to question."" The Court apparently found an
effect upon interstate commerce without discussing its amount or
immediacy.
Thus, by the mid 1950's, the Supreme Court had rendered a
fairly expansive reading to the jurisdictional scope of the Sherman
Act. Despite the Court's guidance, however, the lower courts have
muddled this area with a series of confusing and inconsistent opin-
ions.
II. CONFicTING APPROACHES TO THE
JURISDICrIONAL REQUIREMENT
Following the trend established in the Supreme Court deci-
sions, the lower courts for the most part have adopted the "flow of
commerce" and the "affecting commerce" tests for determining the
jurisdictional reach of the Sherman Act. In Las Vegas Merchant
Plumbers Association v. United States," for example, which in-
volved price fixing in a local plumbing supply market, the court
noted that the act complained of would fall within the jurisdictional
scope of the Sherman Act if it were shown that the transaction at
the root of the alleged violation was either in interstate commerce
or affected interstate commerce."
41. 336 U.S. 460 (1949).
42. Id. at 464.
43. 347 U.S. 186 (1954).
44. Id. at 189.
45. 210 F.2d 732 (9th Cir. 1954).
46. Id. at 739-40 n.3. For an extensive list of cases decided under these two tests see 16
1979] 1221
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With the development of the "affecting commerce" test in the
Mandeville Farms decision, the earlier "flow of commerce" test has
received less attention from the courts. The "flow of commerce"
theory applies only if an anticompetitive restraint has been im-
posed directly upon goods or services in the stream of interstate
commerce. The test does not apply to restraints imposed on busi-
nesses or goods that merely compete with goods that flow in inter-
state commerce.17 In contrast, courts may rely upon the "affecting
commerce" test when jurisdiction is sought over such indirect
restraints, or over restraints imposed on goods or services before or
after their flow through commerce." Although this may suggest
that the "affecting commerce" test has subsumed the "flow of
commerce" test," there is an important distinction between the two
theories. If illegal restraints are placed directly upon goods or ser-
vices during their flow through commerce, the plaintiff need not
demonstrate the effect on interstate commerce. If the transaction
is not in the flow of commerce and only affects interstate com-
merce, however, the plaintiff must allege an actual impact on inter-
state commerce.so
Despite the broad acceptance of these tests, their actual appli-
cation to specific factual situations by the lower courts has resulted
in a quagmire of conflicting decisions. Although conflicts have oc-
curred in the use of the "flow of commerce" test over such issues as
where the stream of interstate commerce begins and ends,51 the vast
majority of disputes in this area have concerned application of the
"affecting commerce" test. In these cases, it must be shown that the
alleged anticompetitive act had an effect on interstate commerce.
The critical question is how immediate or large this effect on com-
merce must be to establish jurisdiction under the Sherman Act.
VoN KALINOWSKI, supra note 30, at § 5.01[1] nn.15 & 16.
47. Page v. Work, 290 F.2d 323, 330 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 875 (1961).
48. See notes 37-44 supra and accompanying text.
49. In discussing the elusive nature of the dividing line between these two tests, the
court in Rasmussen v. American Dairy Ass'n, 472 F.2d 517, 527 n.20 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
412 U.S. 950 (1973) noted:
Too often in this area, judicial discomfort with uncertainty, aggravated by the rapid
expansion of traditional conceptions of federal commerce power, has led to a continued
grasping for specific, easily applicable standards, standards which regularly had to be
"reinterpreted" or discarded altogether in the face of changing economic realities. In the
final analysis, the real-world business nature of the Sherman Act's purpose and subject
matter permits no easy solution. As noted earlier, it is the duty of the courts to apply
"a practical, case-by-case economic judgment" rather than to take refuge in "abstract
or mechanistic formulae."
50. See 16 VoN KALINowsI, supra note 30, at § 5.01[2] nn.29 & 30.
51. Id. at § 35.01[2][b].
52. In the Wickard decision, the Court used the language "economic effect." See note
33 supra and accompanying text. In the Mandeville Farms case, however, the Court used the
1222 [Vol. 32:1215
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The courts appear to have divided into two camps on this issue.
A. The Broad Approach
Numerous decisions have adopted the view that nearly all eco-
nomic activity satisfies the jurisdictional requirement of the Sher-
man Act. The courts' reasoning in these decisions is an outgrowth
of the Mandeville Farms-opinion and is comparable to the expansive
approach courts have taken in construing other commerce clause
statutes.3 The analytical foundation on which these courts have
justified this broad jurisdictional scope is the belief that Congress
intended to secure a competitive business economy by extending the
substantive provisions of the Sherman Act to the furthest reaches
of its constitutional powers under the commerce clause.54
Courts have applied this broad approach to Sherman Act juris-
diction in a variety of cases. Federal courts have declared, for exam-
ple, that a southern California vehicle locating service,5 the sale of
burial insurance policies,5 ' the intrastate manufacture and market-
ing of a filled milk beverage,' the supply of hospital services in
Philadelphia,58 and the sale of hot mix asphalt from storage tanks
in Florida to Florida purchasers," all had a sufficient effect on the
flow of out-of-state commodities to warrant Sherman Act scrutiny.
In many of these cases, jurisdiction was triggered because the
restraint of trade on an intrastate product or services affected the
purchase of other products that flow in interstate commerce. An
example of this application of the "affecting commerce" test is
Lehrman v. Gulf Oil Corp.,"o in which the Ninth Circuit held that
an alleged local resale price maintenance scheme was actionable
under the Sherman Act because its enforcement might impair the
plaintiff resale gas dealer's economic well-being and thus his future
purchase of tires, batteries and accessories from other states." In
terms "sufficiently substantial" and "adverse" to describe the required effect upon interstate
commerce. See note 38 supra.
53. See notes 7-15 supra and accompanying text.
54. Gough v. Rossmoor Corp., 487 F.2d 373, 375-76 (9th Cir. 1973) (conspiracy to ex-
clude furniture dealer, who received goods produced in other states, from a local retail market
had an adverse effect on interstate commerce).
55. Cartrade, Inc. v. Ford Dealers Advertising Ass'n, 446 F.2d 289, 292 (9th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 997 (1972).
56. Battle v. Liberty Nat'1 Life Ins. Co., 493 F.2d 39 (5th Cir. 1974).
57. Rasmussen v. American Dairy Ass'n, 472 F.2d 517, 524-38 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
412 U.S. 950 (1973).
58. Doctors, Inc. v. Blue Cross, 490 F.2d 48 (3d Cir. 1973).
59. Hardrives Co. v. East Coast Asphalt Corp., 329 F.2d 868, 869-71 (5th Cir. 1964).
60. 464 F.2d 26 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1077 (1972).
61. Id. at 35-36. The sale of gasoline in this case was a totally intrastate transaction. It
was pumped, refined and sold to the final consumer solely in the state of Texas. Id. at 31.
1979] 1223
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reaching this decision, the court noted that "[i]t is the effect on
commerce that determines federal jurisdiction under the Sherman
Act and not any notion of the 'interstate culpability' of those who
engage in anticompetitive practices." 2 Similarly, in United States
v. Finis P. Ernest, Inc.," in which the defendant was charged with
rigging bids for a sewer construction project, the court ruled that the
purchase of $9,000 worth of sewer pipe and manhole covers from out-
of-state suppliers was sufficient evidence, for jurisdictional pur-
poses, of an effect on interstate commerce. The court also found that
the rigged bids increased the cost of the project to the city, which
in turn reduced the funds available for other construction projects
that required out-of-state goods." Finally, one of the furthest exten-
sions of this jurisdictional approach is Copper Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph
Coors Co.," in which the court determined that the unavailability
of Coors beer at a retail store led to a reduced demand at the store
for other products that traveled in interstate commerce. The court
suggested that this impact had a sufficient effect on interstate com-
merce to bring the case within the boundaries of the Sherman Act."
B. The Narrow Approach
In contrast to the broad jurisdictional approach that appears to
require a minimal and direct effect upon interstate commerce, a
significant number of decisions have taken a more restrictive view
and have interpreted the reach of the Sherman Act as falling short
of its potential range under the federal commerce clause power.
These opinions stress that an intrastate activity's incidental effect
on the flow of supplies in interstate commerce does not in itself
transform this activity into an interstate enterprise. In this vein,
lower federal courts have concluded that a local mortuary service
that received supplies and bodies from out of state,7 a county-wide
garbage collection company that purchased equipment in another
state," the management of a state bar review course that involved
out-of-state students and advertising," and the leasing of property
in a shopping center to a supermarket that sold interstate goods,70
62. Id. at 36.
63. 509 F.2d 1256 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 893 (1975).
64. Id. at 1261.
65. 506 F.2d 934 (5th Cir. 1975).
66. Id. at 948-49.
67. John Kalin Funeral Home, Inc. v. Fultz, 313 F. Supp. 435 (W.D. Wash. 1970), aff'd,
442 F.2d 1342 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 404 U.S. 881 (1971).
68. Sun Valley Disposal Co. v. Silver State Disposal Co., 420 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1969).
69. Kallen v. Nexus Corp., 353 F. Supp. 33 (N.D. Ill. 1973).




present too remote or insubstantial a nexus with interstate com-
merce to confer Sherman Act jurisdiction.
In narrowly defining the "affecting commerce" test, these opin-
ions have looked for a more immediate impact on interstate mar-
kets. In Page v. Work,7 for example, the Ninth Circuit held that an
alleged conspiracy to exclude a local newspaper from publishing
legal notices was not within the scope of the Sherman Act, even
though the plaintiff bought newsprint from outside the state, car-
ried a minimal amount of national news and advertising, and had
some out-of-state subscribers. The court found that the conspiracy
was directed at legal advertising, not the newsprint market and
stated that "[t]he test of jurisdiction is not that the acts com-
plained of affect a business engaged in interstate commerce, but
that the conduct complained of affects the interstate commerce of
such business."" Similarly, in Lieberthal v. North Country Lanes,
Inc.73 the court ruled that the "one shot event" of outfitting a bowl-
ing alley with out-of-state equipment did not create a sufficient
effect upon interstate commerce. Finally, in Marston v. Ann Arbor
Property Managers Association4 a charge was brought under the
Sherman Act alleging a conspiracy to raise rents and restrict the
construction of apartments in an area surrounding the University of
Michigan. In dismissing the complaint, the court held that any
effect on the movement of out-of-state students and building mate-
rials was incidental because the conspiracy in question was aimed
only at the local apartment market.
C. Resulting Inconsistent Decisions
As one might expect, the conflict over the jurisdictional reach
of the Sherman Act has led to situations in which the courts have
rendered different results in factually similar cases. For example, in
Doctors, Inc. v. Blue Cross of Greater Philadelphia 7 the Third Cir-
cuit held that an alleged conspiracy by a hospitalization insurer and
a health services agency against a local hospital was within the
jurisdictional scope of the Sherman Act because the alleged re-
straint would sufficiently affect the flow of out-of-state supplies to
the hospital. In reaching this conclusion, however, the court was
forced to note that the Eighth Circuit in Spears Free Clinic and
71. 290 F.2d 323 (9th Cir. 1961).
72. Id. at 330.
73. 332 F.2d 269, 272 (2d Cir. 1964).
74. 302 F. Supp. 1276 (E.D. Mich. 1969), aff'd, 422 F.2d 836 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
399 U.S. 929 (1970).
75. 302 F. Supp. at 1279.
76. 490 F.2d 48 (3d Cir. 1973).
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Hospital v. Cleeren7 had rendered a totally opposite decision in a
nearly identical case dealing with an alleged conspiracy against a
chiropractic hospital in Colorado. Furthermore, the Spears case was
cited as controlling precedent in circuit 8 and district court" deci-
sions rendered before Doctors, Inc. Conflicting decisions also have
been handed down in cases concerning local garbage haulers,"o in-
trastate transportation services,", and. local real estate agencies."
There have even been conflicts between federal courts in a single
circuit." These inconsistent results have led to confusion among
other lower courts and within the antitrust bar. Moreover, prior to
the mid-1970's, the Supreme Court had neither settled these differ-
ences nor established guidelines to end this diversity of opinion."
IV. THE RECENT SUPREME COURT TREND
During the twenty year period that followed United States v.
Employing Plasterers Association,"5 the Supreme Court generally
ignored the question of the jurisdictional reach of the Sherman
Act." Thus, it is surprising that in light of the growing conflict
77. 197 F.2d 125 (10th Cir. 1952).
78. Elizabeth Hosp. Inc. v. Richardson, 269 F.2d 167, 171 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 361
U.S. 884 (1959).
79. Nankin Hosp. v. Michigan Hosp. Serv., 361 F. Supp. 1199, 1210 (E.D. Mich. 1973).
80. Compare A. Cherney Disposal Co. v. Chicago & Suburban Refuse Disposal Ass'n,
484 F.2d 751 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1131 (1974) with Sun Valley Disposal Co. v.
Silver State Disposal Co., 420 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1969).
81. Compare Evanston Cab Co. v. City of Chicago, 325 F.2d 907 (7th Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 943 (1964) (local taxi-cab operation had insubstantial effect on interstate
commerce) with A.B.T. Sightseeing Tours, Inc. v. Gray Line Corp., 242 F. Supp. 365
(S.D.N.Y. 1965) (intrastate sightseeing tour had sufficient effect upon interstate commerce).
82. See notes 111 & 120 infra and accompanying text.
83. Compare Gateway Assocs. v. Essex-Costello, Inc., 380 F. Supp. 1089 (N.D. Ill. 1974)
with A. Cherney Disposal Co. v. Chicago & Suburban Refuse Disposal Ass'n, 484 F.2d 751,
760 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1131 (1974). The court in Gateway observed:
Despite the good sense expressed in the Marston and Cotillion cases, I must decline
to follow them due to the Seventh Circuit's holding in A. Cherney Disposal Co. v.
Chicago & Suburban Refuse Disposal Ass'n, supra. There the Court held the juris-
dictional test was met. . . . [although] . . . virtually all of the defendants' activity
was local. . . . The law of this Circuit now seems to require the district courts to try
antitrust cases on the merits before they may determine whether they even have the
jurisdiction or power to do so. Obviously, this makes little sense and adds to the burgeon-
ing caseload of the district courts. Nevertheless, Cherney represents the law of this
Circuit and it must be followed unless and until it is overruled or reserved.
380 F. Supp. at 1094.
84. See McGee, The Burger Court Looks at the Antitrust Laws: A New Approach, 2
BAmusTER 21, 26 (Winter 1975).
85. 347 U.S. 186 (1954). See notes 43-44 supra and accompanying text.
86. The only Supreme Court opinion during this period that focused on the jurisdic-
tional issue was Burke v. Ford, 389 U.S. 320 (1967). In Burke Oklahoma liquor retailers
brought an action under the Sherman Act against liquor wholesalers in the state, charging
that wholesalers had restrained commerce by dividing up the state market into exclusive
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among the lower courts, the Supreme Court in 1974 avoided ex-
pressly reconciling this issue in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co.' 7
The plaintiff in Gulf Oil was a California asphaltic concrete dealer
whose product was manufactured wholly from components pro-
duced and purchased intrastate. California used this concrete in the
construction of a portion of its interstate highway system. In a suit
alleging various antitrust offenses, the plaintiff relied upon its nexus
with this instrumentality of interstate commerce to establish juris-
diction under the Sherman, Clayton and Robinson-Patman Acts.
The court of appeals found jurisdiction under all three statutes.8 8
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court only granted review of the Clay-
ton and Robinson-Patman charges, holding that the narrow juris-
dictional reach of these two statutes did not extend to the re-
straints in question." In contrasting the jurisdictional scope of these
statutes to the more expansive Sherman Act, however, the Court
did note "that in enacting § 1 Congress 'wanted to go to the utmost
extent of its Constitutional power in restraining trust and monopoly
agreements . . . .' " Moreover, in discussing the "flow of com-
merce" and "affecting commerce" tests, the Court cited Mandeville
Farms, noting that an act may constitute a restraint under the
Sherman Act "if it substantially and adversely affects interstate
commerce." 9'
In 1975, the Supreme Court once again had the opportunity to
clarify the jurisdictional scope of the Sherman Act in the case of
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar.92 In Goldfarb the Court discussed
whether a minimum fee schedule set by a county bar association for
real estate title searches acted as a restraint upon interstate com-
merce. In ruling that the fee schedule was subject to attack under
the Sherman Act, the Court chose not to analyze the plaintiffs
jurisdictional allegations in terms of either of the two tests employed
territories. In its brief opinion, the Court first discussed the two jurisdictional tests, explain-
ing that "an activity which does not itself occur in interstate commerce comes within the
scope of the Sherman Act if it substantially affects interstate commerce." Id. at 321 (empha-
sis in original). Although the market diversion in the case was not directed at influencing
interstate commerce, the Court found that as a matter of practical economics, the restraint
had a substantial effect on the flow of commerce. The Court noted that "[tihe wholesalers'
territorial division . . . almost surely resulted in fewer sales to retailers-hence fewer pur-
chases from out-of-state distillers-than would have occurred had free competition prevailed
among the wholesalers." Id. at 322.
87. 419 U.S. 186 (1974).
88. 487 F.2d 202 (9th Cir. 1973).
89. 419 U.S. at 199.
90. Id. at 194-95, citing United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S.
533, 558 (1944).
91. Id. at 195.
92. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
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by the lower courts, 3 but rather applied a more ad hoc approach.
The Court first noted that in a practical sense, title examiners were
an integral part of the interstate aspects of purchasing a home be-
cause they are prerequisites for obtaining a home mortgage." Home
mortgages were considered interstate transactions because nearly
half of the mortgages were granted by out-of-state lenders and many
were insured by out-of-state federal agencies. Because of the large
amount of real estate funds flowing into the state, the Court held
that a sufficiently substantial effect upon interstate commerce for
jurisdictional purposes existed, but did not describe the exact char-
acter and amount of this effect." Thus, although the Court's ad hoc
approach did little to ameliorate the uncertainty found in the lower
courts, the opinion did suggest that the Court was leaning toward a
fairly broad reading of the Sherman Act's jurisdictional require-
ments.
In the most recent Supreme Court decision on this subject,
Hospital Building Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hospital," the Court con-
tinued to extend the jurisdictional reach of the Sherman Act. Rex
Hospital dealt with an allegation by the plaintiff hospital that a
nearby non-profit hospital conspired to prevent the plaintiffs relo-
cation and expansion within the same city. The circuit court dis-
missed plaintiffs complaint because of an insufficient nexus be-
tween the alleged antitrust violation and interstate commerce.' 7
Plaintiff alleged, however, that a cluster of contacts existed between
its operations and interstate commerce: it purchased up to eighty
percent of its medicines and supplies from out-of-state sources; re-
ceived significant revenues from out-of-state insurance companies;
remitted management service fees to its out-of-state parent corpora-
tion; and would borrow from out-of-state lenders to finance part of
its planned expansion."
The Supreme Court held in Rex Hospital that this combination
of factors was "certainly sufficient to establish a 'substantial effect'
on interstate commerce under the Act."" In reaching this conclusion
93. See notes 45-50 supra and accompanying text.
94. 421 U.S. at 784.
95. The Court emphasized that "our cases have shown that, once an effect is shown,
no specific magnitude need be proved." Id. at 785.
96. 425 U.S. 738 (1976).
97. 511 F.2d 678 (4th Cir. 1975).
98. 425 U.S. at 744. In 1972, for example, the plaintiff spent $112,000 on medicines and
supplies from out of state.
99. Id. While there was some ambiguity over whether the lower courts' decisions were
grounded on Rule 12(b)(1) or Rule 12(b)(6), the Court treated the dismissal as having been
based on Rule 12(b)(6), noting, however, that its analysis would be the same if it were based
on want of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1). "In either event, the critical
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the Court first noted that its previous decisions had "permitted the
reach of the Sherman Act to expand along with expanding notions
of congressional power."1oo This expansion resulted in the Sherman
Act encompassing far more than restraints on trade designed to
limit interstate commerce or whose sole impact was on interstate
commerce. The fact that an effect on interstate commerce might be
indirect did not remove.it from the scope of the Act.'01 The Court
stated that "'wholly local business restraints can produce the
effects condemned by the Sherman Act,' "102 as long as the alleged
restraint "'substantially and adversely affects interstate com-
merce.' "103 The Court broadly defined the term "substantial," how-
ever, declaring that "[a]n effect can be 'substantial' under the
Sherman Act even if its impact on interstate commerce falls far
short of causing enterprises to fold or affecting market price."04
Prior to the Goldfarb and Rex Hospital decisions, the lower
courts often held that intrastate transactions with an indirect re-
straint on the flow of goods or services would not have a sufficient
effect on interstate commerce. 0o In these two decisions, however,
the Court has broadly read the Sherman Act's commerce clause
powers to encompass such acts. In referring to these decisions, Jus-
tice Blackmun noted:
It is true that the framers of the Sherman Act expressed the view that certain
areas of economic activity were left entirely to state regulation. . . . A careful
reading of these standards reveals, however, that they little more than reflect
the then-prevailing view that Congress lacked the power, under the Commerce
Clause, to regulate economic activity that was within the domain of the States.
The Court since then has recognized a greatly expanded Commerce Clause
power . .. for it has been held that Congress intended the reach of the Sher-
man Act to expand along with that of the commerce power.m"
In expanding its jurisdictional powers under the Sherman Act, the
inquiry is into the adequacy of the nexus between respondents' conduct and interstate com-
merce that is alleged in the complaint." Id. at 742 n.1.
100. Id. at 743 n.2.
101. Id. at 744. The Court noted that an effect would be indirect if the conduct produc-
ing it was not purposely directed at interstate commerce. Id.
102. Id. at 743, citing United States v. Employing Plasterers Ass'n, 347 U.S. 186, 189
(1954).
103. Id. citing Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 195 (1974) and Mande-
ville Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 234 (1948). In calculating this
effect, the Court stated that it should be based on "practical economics." Id. at 745.
104. Id. at 745. In its closing paragraph, the Court stressed that only in rare instances
should a court dismiss an antitrust complaint before the plaintiff has had ample opportunity
for discovery. Thus the Cotrt stated that all that need be alleged to adequately state a claim
is that the restraint, if successful, would place "unreasonable burdens on the free and uninter-
rupted flow of interstate commerce." Id. at 746.
105. See notes 67-75 supra and accompanying text.
106. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 605-06 (1976) (concurring opinion).
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Court nonetheless has suggested that the restraint in question must
substantially and adversely affect interstate commerce. The Court's
expansive interpretation of this phrase in Rex Hospital, however,
shows how easy it is to meet this requirement.
V. IMPACT ON THE LOWER COURTS
The vast majority of lower. court cases rendered since the
Goldfarb and Rex Hospital decisions have broadly interpreted the
jurisdictional requirements of the Sherman Act."' In many of these
cases, the courts have found Sherman Act jurisdiction when the
plaintiff or defendant purchased supplies or services from out-of-
state and the restraint in question indirectly affected these pur-
chases. Although some of these decisions have focused on the actual
amount of interstate commerce affected, several of the cases have
merely discussed the factors that could affect interstate commerce.
An example of this broad trend is the case of J. P. Mascaro &
Sons v. William J. O'Hara, Inc.,"o' in which a refuse hauler sued
various other haulers and landfill operators, alleging that they con-
spired to fix prices and allocate territories in order to drive him out
of business. All of the plaintiffs customers and all but one of the
107. Harold Friedman, Inc. v. Thorofare Markets Inc., 1978-2 Trade Cas. 62,344 (3d
Cir. 1978) (supermarket); United States v. Andrew Carlson & Sons, 1978-2 Trade Cas.
62,310 (2d Cir. 1978) (pre-cast concrete products); United States v. American Serv. Corp.,
1978-2 62,238 (5th Cir. 1978) (linen service); Canadian American Oil Co. v. Union Oil Co.
of California, 577 F.2d 468 (9th Cir. 1978) (gasoline dealership); United States v. Cadillac
Overall Supply Co., 568 F.2d 1078 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 3088 (1978) (garment
supplies); J.P. Mascaro & Sons v. William J. O'Hara, Inc., 565 F.2d 264 (3d Cir. 1977)
(garbage haulers); City of Fairfax v. Fairfax Hosp. Ass'n, 562 F.2d 280 (4th Cir. 1977) (hospi-
tal); Tiger Trash v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 560 F.2d 818 (7th Cir. 1977) (garbage haulers);
Americana Indus. v. Wometco de Puerto Rico Inc., 556 F.2d 625 (1st Cir. 1977) (motion
picture); Mortensen v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 549 F.2d 884 (3d Cir. 1977) (real estate
mortgages); Boddicker v. Arizona State Dental Ass'n, 549 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1977) (dental
association); Evans v. S.S. Kresge Co., 544 F.2d 1184 (3d Cir. 1976) (discount store); Ballard
v. Blue Shield Inc., 543 F.2d 1075 (4th Cir. 1976) (chiropractors); Northern v. McGraw-
Edison Co., 542 F.2d 1336 (8th Cir. 1976) (dry cleaning franchise); Taxi Weekly, Inc. v.
Metropolitan Taxicab Bd., 539 F.2d 907 (2d Cir. 1976) (taxi newspaper); Klein v. Checker
Motois Corp., 1978-2 Trade Cas. 62,330 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (taxi service); United States v.
Greater Syracuse Bd. of Realtors, 449 F. Supp. 887 (N.D.N.Y. 1978) (real estate agents); L&H
Invs. v. Belvey Corp., 444 F. Supp. 1321 (W.D.N.C. 1978) (shopping center leases); United
States v. Jack Foley Realty, Inc., 1977-2 Trade Cas. 61,678 (D. Md. 1977) (real estate
agents); United States v. Southern Motor Carrier Rate Conference, 439 F. Supp. 29 (N.D.
Ga. 1977) (motor carriers); United States v. Brighton Bldg. & Maintenance Co., 435 F. Supp.
222 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (highway construction); Weber v. Wynne, 431 F. Supp. 1048 (D.N.J. 1977)
(press clipping bureau); Zamiri v. William Beaumont Hosp., 430 F. Supp. 875 (E.D. Mich.
1977) (doctors' services); Presido Golf Club v. National Linen Supply Corp., 1976-2 Trade
Cas. 61,221 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (linen supplies); United States v. Allied Maintenance Corp.,
1976-2 Trade Cas. 61,179 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (building maintenance service); Joe Westbrook,
Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 419 F. Supp. 824 (N.D. Ga. 1976) (car dealership).
108. 565 F.2d 264 (3d Cir. 1977).
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defendants' customers were located in Pennsylvania. During the
four year period in question, however, the plaintiff had purchased
from local retailers at least $310,000 in equipment and supplies
manufactured outside of the state, had paid $55,000 in premiums
to out-of-state insurers, and had borrowed $256,000 from out-of-
state lending institutions.o'0 Based on these factors, the court held
that the conspiracy affected interstate commerce.'
Another example of this liberal interpretation of the jurisdic-
tional requirement is United States v. Jack Foley Realty, Inc."I The
defendants in Foley were criminally charged with conspiring to fix
commission rates for the sale of residential real estate in a Maryland
county. The indictment alleged that a substantial number of per-
sons using defendants' services were moving to or from places out-
side the state; that defendants belonged to nationwide referral serv-
ices; that defendants advertised their listings in newspapers with
interstate circulation; and that defendants assisted purchasers in
securing financing, much of which came from out-of-state sources.
The court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss, holding that
the defendants' activities, when considered in the aggregate, had a
substantial effect upon interstate commerce.112
Despite the expansive approach developed by the Supreme
Court, several lower courts have continued to narrowly interpret the
jurisdictional scope of the Sherman Act. In many of these cases, the
courts appear to be using the jurisdictional requirement as a tool to
dismiss complaints concerning relatively local restraints when the
substantive antitrust allegations are of doubtful merit."3 In other
cases, courts have denied jurisdiction when a substantial effect on
interstate commerce would arguably exist under a broad reading of
109. Id. at 266. Citing the Liebenthal and Page cases, see notes 71-73 supra, the District
Court held that these factors did not offset interstate commerce. The Court of Appeals noted,
however, that the Rex Hospital decision cast "substantial doubt on the authorities supporting
the district court's reasoning," Id. The court stressed that "the trend in interpreting the
'affecting commerce' test has been to broaden it." Id. at 267.
110. In supporting this conclusion, the court stated:
The conspiracy is said to be aimed at driving the plaintiff out of business and limiting
competition among those remaining in the field. That such a result would significantly
decrease the amount of out-of-state purchases by the refuse dealers (and totally elimi-
nate those of Mascaro) as well as increase the amount charged customers who pay from
out-of-state is a matter of economic reality.
Id. at 268.
111. 1977-2 Trade Cas. % 61,678 (D. Md. 1977).
112. Id. at 72,790.
113. See Save Our Cemeteries, Inc. v. The Archdiocese of New Orleans, Inc., 1978-1
Trade Cas. T 61,893 (5th Cir. 1978) (use of wall vaults in a cemetery); Morgan v. Odem, 1977-
1 Trade Cas. 61,432 (5th Cir. 1977) (breach of contract in home construction); Dominion
Parking Corp. v. B. & 0. R.R., 450 F. Supp. 441 (E.D. Va. 1978) (parking lot lease); Foret v.
Point Landing, Inc., 1976-2 Trade Cas. % 61,106 (E.D. La. 1976) (lease of riverfront property).
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the Sherman Act's jurisdictional requirement."'
This narrow approach to the interstate commerce requirement
is exemplified by Universal Services of Indiana, Inc. v. Central
Waste Systems. 1 5 This case dealt with an alleged price cutting
scheme designed to monopolize the business of refuse removal in
two Indiana counties. The plaintiff garbage hauler received over
$18,000 per year to service a client in Illinois. Moreover, the plaintiff
serviced many large interstate corporations whose refuse removal
costs would artificially rise if the defendants were to monopolize the
market."6 Although the court noted the broad approach taken by
the Supreme Court in the Rex Hospital decision, it nonetheless
found that the plaintiff was neither in the flow of c6mmerce nor
substantially affected interstate commerce."' In concluding that the
plaintiff at best affected only a de minimus amount of interstate
business, the court approvingly cited Page v. Work"' and the dis-
trict court opinion in the J. P. Mascarous case.
Another narrow interpretation of the Sherman Act's jurisdic-
tional requirement is found in McLain v. Real Estate Board of New
Orleans, Inc.' Although this case was factually indistinguishable
from the Jack Foley decision,12 ' the court nonetheless ruled that the
alleged price-fixing activities of local real estate brokers did not
substantially affect interstate commerce.122 The plaintiffs had
charged that many of the defendants' customers were from out of
state and that the defendants participated in securing home financ-
ing and title insurance from sources outside the state. Based on
these facts, the plaintiffs argued that their case was controlled by
the Supreme Court's decision in Goldfarb.123 The court distin-
114. McLain v. Real Estate Bd., 1978-2 Trade Cas. 1 62,341 (5th Cir. 1978) (real estate
brokers); Income Realty & Mortgage Inc. v. Denver Bd. of Realtors, 578 F.2d 1326 (10th Cir.
1978) (real estate broker); Bryan v. Stillwater Bd. of Realtors, 1978-1 Trade Cas. 62,078
(10th Cir. 1977) (real estate broker); Universal Serv. v. Central Waste Sys., 1977-1 Trade Cas.
T 61,244 (S.D. Ind. 1977) (garbage haulers).
115. 1977-1 Trade Cas. 1 61,244 (S.D. Ind. 1977).
116. Id. at 70,723-724. The court did not mention whether the plaintiff brought any out-
of-state supplies.
117. Id.
118. See notes 71-72 supra and accompanying text.
119. See note 109 supra.
120. 1978-2 Trade Cas. 62,341 (5th Cir. 1978).
121. See notes 111-12 supra and accompanying text.
122. The district court dismissed the case under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a
claim. Although the Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal, it did so under Rule 12(b)(1),
claiming a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See note 99 supra. See generally Mortensen v.
First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 549 F.2d 884, 890-97 (3d Cir. 1977).
123. 1978-2 Trade Cas. at 76,050. The plaintiffs also contended that allegations of per
se violations, such as price fixing, give rise to a presumption of a substantial effect on
commerce. The basis of this argument probably lies in the theory advanced by Professor
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guished Goldfarb, however, by ruling that real estate brokers, unlike
lawyers, constitute an incidental rather than an integral part of the
interstate commerce of title insurance and realty financing and thus
could not substantially effect interstate commerce.12' The court con-
cluded by rejecting the plaintiffs' request for a trial on the merits
and thus denied them the opportunity to more fully develop their
jurisdictional assertions. Although the court noted that the
"dazzling complexity of antitrust litigation rarely commends dis-
missal in advance of trial," it balanced this concern against the
financial hardships imposed on defendants in antitrust trials.'"
VI. ANALYSIS OF THE JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENT
The decisions that have applied a narrow judicial construction
to the Sherman Act's jurisdictional requirement have supported
this approach on several grounds. One argument is that there must
be some limit on the intrusiveness of Sherman Act regulation be-
cause every enterprise, however local, inevitably has some effect
upon the flow of interstate commerce.12 1 This narrow approach is
also justified on the ground that our nation is experiencing a growing
spirit of federalism manifested at all levels of judicial and legislative
decisionmaking.'" This spirit is fueled by the realization that state
processes, including state antitrust laws, are often available to com-
bat local anticompetitive conduct. Finally, these decisions find judi-
cial support for their restrictive interpretation of the jurisdictional
reach of the Sherman Act from the series of Supreme Court cases
that require the alleged anticompetitive act in question have a
"substantial" effect upon interstate commerce.'" It is suggested
that this requirement cannot be met if the anticompetitive act
Areeda who notes that "iif certain conduct be held within the antitrust ban because of its
potential for harm, regardless of demonstrated harm in any particular case . . . it [is]
inconsistent simultaneously to require proof of effects to satisfy the statute's jurisdictional
test." P. AREEDA, ANTrrausT ANALYsIs 122 (2d ed. 1974). Citing Professor Areeda, the Seventh
Circuit established a reduced jurisdictional threshhold for per se cases in an alternative
holding in United States v. Finis P. Ernest, Inc., 509 F.2d 1256, 1260 (7th Cir. 1975). The
McLain court rejected this argument, however, observing that the per se rule relates to the
merits of a claim by conclusively establishing the unreasonableness of a particular restraint
and this principle does not eliminate the need for a jurisdictional determination of whether
a restraint sufficiently affects interstate commerce. 1978-2 Trade Cas. at 76,051.
124. 1978-2 Trade Cas. at 76,052-053. The court adopted its "incidental" and "integral"
language from United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 231-33 (1947). See notes 34-35
supra and accompanying text. In discussing the jurisdictional requirements of the Sherman
Act, the court did not mention the Rex Hospital decision.
125. 1978-2 Trade Cas. at 76,053. But see note 104 supra.
126. Rasmussen v. American Dairy Ass'n, 472 F.2d 517, 526 (9th Cir. 1972).
127. See, e.g., National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). A similar convic-
tion is expressed in the Revenue Sharing Act, 31 U.S.C. §§1221-1265 (1976).
128. See notes 38, 52, 91, 95, 99 and 103 supra and accompanying text.
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causes only a remote or incidental effect upon the flow of interstate
commerce.
Despite these arguments, this narrow view of the scope of the
Sherman Act must be rejected in favor of a broad reading of the
Act's jurisdictional requirements. The commerce power should not
be an inconstant variable, vulnerable to the subjective, ad hoc inter-
pretations of the courts, but rather should be changed only by the
general progression of federal authority over a period of time." Its
application and scope should be identical under various statutes
unless Congress has specifically stated otherwise.' No evidence of
legislative intent exists to suggest that Congress intended to limit
the jurisdictional reach of the Sherman Act to less than the full
extent of congressional regulatory power.'' Moreover, in contrast to
the more stringent jurisdictional language of the Clayton and
Robinson-Patman Acts,'3 the Sherman Act is worded broadly, sug-
gesting that Congress intended to apply the Act in the most compre-
hensive manner possible. Congress' recent effort to expand the scope
of the Federal Trade Commission Act by altering its jurisdictional
language so that it coincides with that of the Sherman Act'3 lends
further support to this broad interpretation.
Nor can proponents of a narrow jurisdictional approach hide
behind the sporadic resurgence of federalism or the claim that state
antitrust laws provide sufficient protection for injured businesses
and individuals. Although nearly all states have some form of anti-
trust law, the content of these laws varies greatly. 3 Furthermore,
even if the state has a detailed antitrust statute, numerous factors
exist that prevent its full enforcement. These factors include insuffi-
cient legislative appropriations; lack of trained, full-time antitrust
personnel; cumbersome remedies and sanctions; the fear of many
state legislators that vigorous antitrust enforcement will drive busi-
ness from the state; and the forceful opposition of local business-
men to meaningful state reform.'3 5 A broad interpretation of the
129. Note, Portrait of the Sherman Act as a Commerce Clause Statute, 49 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 323, 336-37 (1974).
130. See notes 7-15 supra and accompanying text.
131. In fact, during debate over the Sherman Act in the House, Representative Stewart
remarked: "The provisions of this trust bill are just as broad, sweeping and explicit as the
English language can make them to express the power of Congress over this subject under
the Constitution." 21 CONG. REc. 6314 (1890).
132. See note 15 supra.
133. Id.
134. See Fellmoth & Papageorge, A Treatise on State Antitrust Law and Enforcement,
892 ANTrusT & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 1, 24-29 (Supp. 1978); Rubin, Rethinking State
Antitrust Enforcement, 26 U. FiA. L. REV. 653, 696-99 (1974); Wood, Resurgence of State
Antitrust Action: Prices and Public Awareness, 9 ANTrrausTL. & EcoN. REV. 41,41-43 (1977).
135. Rubin, supra note 134 at 698-99. In 1977, for example, the combined annual state
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Sherman Act's jurisdictional requirements not only provides for a
uniform application of federal law and the well-established legal
precedent supporting it, but also provides plaintiffs with the liberal
discovery' and class action provisions 7 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.
Admittedly, nearly every economic act in our interconnected
national economy will have some effect on the flow of interstate
commerce. Rather than support a narrow approach, however, this
truism justifies applying the Sherman Act to the full extent of con-
gressional commerce power. The denial of Sherman Act protection
merely because a court has arbitrarily determined that an alleged
anticompetitive act will have a remote or incidental effect upon
interstate commerce can only lead to a myriad of inconsistent deci-
sions that will confuse future courts and practitioners alike as to
the jurisdictional reach of the Sherman Act. Instead, the courts
should acknowledge the economic realities of our interrelated
national economy and broadly apply the Sherman Act whenever an
alleged restraint has an effect on the flow of interstate commerce.
Based on this analysis, the recent lower court decisions that
have restrictively applied the jurisdictional provisions of the Sher-
man Act'" can be criticized on several grounds. In all of these cases,
the courts have apparently ignored the significance of the long line
of Supreme Court decisions, beginning with Mandeville Farms and
culminating in the recent Goldfarb and Rex Hospital opinions, that
have expansively interpreted the jurisdictional reach of the Sher-
man Act. These lower court decisions fail to provide support from
the legislative history of the Sherman Act or from other Supreme
Court decisions that would rebut the impact of the Mandeville
Farms-Rex Hospital line of cases. Moreover, in those cases in which
the courts have used the jurisdictional requirement as a tool to
dismiss complaints that are trivial or lack substantive merit,'13 the
courts should be criticized for misusing the jurisdictional dismissal.
Courts should deal with the substantive merits of a case directly
rather than under the pretense of a jurisdictional determination.
Finally, the McLain'1' court should be criticized for ignoring the
antitrust budgets were estimated at not more than $7,000,000. The state employed, in the
aggregate, fewer than 100 full-time antitrust attorneys. This compares with a legal staff of
442 and an annual budget of over $22,000,000 for the federal Justice Department's Antitrust
Division and more than 200 attorneys and a yearly budget of $20,000,000 for the FTC's
antitrust bureau. Fellmoth & Papageorge, supra note 134 at 42-43.
136. FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37.
137. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
138. See notes 113-25 supra and accompanying text.
139. See note 113 supra and accompanying text.
140. See notes 120-25 supra and accompanying text.
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economic realities of the real estate business by suggesting that the
securing of home financing and title insurance from out of state
sources would not sufficiently affect interstate commerce. The
court's use of such terms as "incidental" and "integral" is compara-
ble to the "indirect" or "remote" language of previous lower court
decisions and serves only to confuse the issue at hand by cloaking
the matter in vague language."'
Although the Supreme Court's opinion in Rex Hospital pro-
vides the impetus for an expansive application of the Sherman Act's
jurisdictional requirement, it left unanswered one final question
concerning the ultimate reach of the Act into local activities. In
describing the breadth of the Sherman Act, the Court in one in-
stance borrowed language from the earlier Mandeville Farms deci-
sion and stated that the alleged restraint must have a "substantial"
effect upon interstate commerce. 14 2 Unfortunately, the term
"substantial" is quite vague and has been interpreted to mean
"real, true, not imaginary," or "belonging to or having substance,"
and even "of considerable size, large."143 Several lower courts that
have restrictively applied the jurisdictional requirement of the
Sherman Act have construed this language from the Rex Hospital
case to require a direct and large impact on interstate commerce."'
The Rex Hospital decision, on the other hand, broadly defined the
term "substantial," noting that the effect of the alleged restraint
may be indirect and need not cause business failure or alter market
price. 5 The Court did not specifically state, however, how minimal
the effect can be or whether it must be of a quantifiable nature.
In view of the expansive tone of the Supreme Court's recent
decisions, future courts should broadly apply the jurisdictional lan-
guage of the Sherman Act to all economic activities. Once the plain-
tiff has alleged that the restraint in question will have a real effect
upon interstate commerce, the court should presume that the re-
straint will have a sufficient impact upon interstate commerce to
satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of the Act. Only if the defen-
dant can show that the effect is truely de minimus should the court
dismiss the action on jurisdictional grounds.'" Although the use of
141. The "incidental" and "integral" terms originated in United States v. Yellow Cab
Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947). See notes 34-36 supra and accompanying text. This case was the
last decision by the Supreme Court to dismiss a Sherman Act complaint on jurisdictional
grounds and was decided before the Court developed the broad "affecting commerce" test in
Mandeville Farms.
142. See note 99 supra and accompanying text.
143. WEBsTER's NEW TwENTIETH CENTURY DIcrIONARY 1817 (1964).
144. See notes 113-19 supra and accompanying text.
145. See note 104 supra and accompanying text.
146. Unlike the Universal Services decision that dismissed a Sherman Act complaint
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a "presumptive effects" test may be arbitrary and lack specific
guidelines, it is preferable over a standard based on a fixed dollar
amount of interstate commerce that must be reinterpreted or dis-
carded in light of changing economic realities. Moreover, a "pre-
sumptive effects" test is in line with Congress' desire to prohibit
anticompetitive conduct through full use of its constitutional power.
VII. CONCLUSION
Over the past fifty years, plaintiffs have called upon the federal
judiciary to deal with antitrust disputes of an increasingly local
nature. Although the courts have responded by generally broaden-
ing the range of activities which satisfy the substantive elements of
the Sherman Act, their approach to the jurisdictional requirement
of the statute has been far from consistent. As a matter of statutory
construction, this inconsistency, when compared to the expansive
jurisdictional approach applied to other statutes based on the com-
merce clause, is not justified, at least in the absence of a congres-
sional intention to limit the reach of the Sherman Act.
The Supreme Court has recently attempted to reduce some of
the confusion in this area by rendering a series of decisions that
broadly construe the jurisdictional scope of the Sherman Act. De-
spite these decisions, several lo'ver courts have continued to nar-
rowly interpret the jurisdictional requirement of the Act. In view of
the economic realities of our interrelated economy, future courts
should broadly apply the Sherman Act to local activities in order
to effectively implement the Act's provisions.
ROBERT D. ECKINGER
on the grounds that the alleged effect on interstate commerce was de minimus despite the
fact that over $18,000 worth of interstate business was affected, this suggested approach
would require that only a truly insignificant amount of interstate commerce could be affected
if the complaint was to be dismissed on jurisdictional grounds.
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